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Abstract: Armed conflict, and to a lesser extent terrorism, have detrimental effect 
on economic and social development through destruction of human and physical 
capital and ensuing disruption to economic activity. There is also likely to be an 
indirect effect of political instability through its impact on foreign aid. The net 
effect is not obvious; violence may discourage aid donors and hence lead to a fall 
in received aid on the one hand, but it may well lead to an increase in foreign aid 
as donors offer reimbursement for counterterrorism efforts on the other hand. 
This paper uses a panel of countries to identify the net effect of armed conflict 
and terrorism, both domestic and international, on aid receipts. It shows that 
armed conflict has a negative effect on the amounts of both bilateral and mul-
tilateral aid. It also finds that terrorism tends to increase foreign assistance. The 
effect is stronger for bilateral aid; this is consistent with the expectation that they 
are likely to use foreign aid to directly or indirectly assist governments fighting 
terrorism. Nonetheless, these results do not hold for Muslim countries which do 
not receive increased aid when suffering from terrorism.
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1  Introduction
Foreign aid is often claimed to serve as a tool to promote social and economic 
development, which may be hindered if a country experiences an episode of 
armed conflict or increased terrorist activity (Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides 
2004; Collier 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2009). In the presence of violence 
and instability, donors may be deterred from providing foreign aid for a number 
of reasons. The most obvious one is the destruction of human and physical 
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capital which may reduce the recipient’s capacity to effectively absorb aid and 
also affect commercial interests of foreign donors. Internal tensions associated 
with instability may increase the risk of corruption and misappropriation of aid 
funds and as such may constitute another deterrent to providing assistance. 
Furthermore, in the presence of two or more competing groups within a receiv-
ing country, foreign donors may be accused of interfering in recipient’s internal 
affairs by providing support to one of those groups. On the one hand, such a sit-
uation may discourage donors who are committed to non-interference in other 
countries’ internal affairs, but on the other hand, it may prompt some donors 
to provide additional assistance if this furthers their strategic interests. The 
latter is more likely to be true for bilateral donors for whom the impact of aid on 
development is not necessarily the main concern (Burnside and Dollar 2000). 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that donors consider a number of other factors 
such as geopolitics, strategic alliances and colonial history when making their 
decisions.
Security concerns are likely to be another significant factor in aid allocation 
decisions. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas (2011) suggest that counterter-
rorism-tied aid exhibits a degree of substitutability with donor’s own security 
efforts. In their opinion, states with global interests should introduce proactive 
measures by providing aid to countries where international terrorist groups 
reside. They propose a principal-agent relationship in which the donor (prin-
cipal) expects the receiving government (agent) to contain terrorism before it 
spreads to the donor’s homeland. Noteworthy, the aid does not have to be a direct 
reimbursement for counterterrorist efforts. Assistance given to other areas, such 
as education or healthcare, could help the receiving government to free up more 
resources for fighting terrorism. Indeed, Azam and Thelen (2008) find evidence 
that increased aid leads to reduced levels of terrorism originating from the receiv-
ing country. Thus, security considerations make terrorism a potential determi-
nant of aid flows.
This paper looks at the impact of conflict and terrorism on foreign aid, using a 
panel of countries. It distinguishes between bilateral and multilateral assistance 
because the two types are likely to respond differently to various factors. Multi-
lateral donors are expected to respond to the quality of government and policies 
in the receiving states, as well as promote reductions in military expenditure. In 
contrast, bilateral donors are likely to be driven by their commercial interests, 
strategic alliances, security concerns and historical factors (Boyce and Pastor 
1998). Another issue considered in this paper is whether religion plays a role in 
aid allocation. A large share of terrorism in recent decades has been driven by 
Muslim fundamentalists (Lis 2011), therefore this paper tries to verify whether the 
determinants of aid flows to Muslim countries are different.
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A number of studies analyzed the impact of instability in receiving states on 
aid flows. Chauvet (2003) found an “inverted-U” relationship between aid and 
violent instability. Low levels of instability resulted in increased aid, as donors 
attempted to safeguard their interests, but as the threat level increased, donors 
shifted their attention to more stable countries. Boutton and Carter (2014) demon-
strated that the United States used foreign aid to fight terrorism by assisting coun-
tries within whose borders there was terrorist activity which directly threatened 
US security. Bandyopadhay, Sandler, and Younas (2011) used a game theoretic 
model, which allows aid to be conditioned on the undertaking of certain coun-
terterrorism efforts by the receiving government. They warned that terrorism-tied 
aid may result in protests in the receiving country and if the regime becomes suffi-
ciently weakened, its ability to fight terrorists may become limited, and the threat 
to both the donor and recipient may rise.
2  Data and method
The empirical analysis is conducted on a panel of 186 countries covering years 
from 1973 to 2007. Constant-dollar figures on bilateral and multilateral aid are 
drawn from the Project-Level Aid 1.9.1, available from AidData.org (see Nielson, 
Powers, and Tierney 2010). Population, real GDP per capita and country open-
ness (exports plus imports as a share of GDP) are drawn from the Penn World 
Table Version 7.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012). The Freedom House’s (1972–
2009) civil liberties index is used to control for the relationship between aid and 
recipients’ level of democracy. The index ranks countries on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. The fraction-
alization dataset (Alesina et al. 2003) is used to identify countries with Muslim 
majorities. The data on terrorism is taken from Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 
(2011) who separated the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into international and 
domestic components. Their dataset reports 44,487 domestic and 10,564 interna-
tional terrorist incidents over the analyzed period. Finally, the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset Version 4-2009 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) is a source of data for an 
indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if a country experienced conflict in a 
given year, or zero otherwise.
The estimation method is the Heckman two-step selection model, which is 
broadly used and discussed in the related literature (e.g., Boutton and Carter 2014; 
Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007). In the first “gate-keeping” stage donors 
choose countries to which aid is given, while in the second “allocation” stage they 
decide the amount of aid given to selected recipients. A credible identification of 
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the model requires an introduction of the exclusion restrictions. Following Carter 
and Signorino (2010) a cubic polynomial in time since a country has received 
foreign aid is added to the selection equation (t, t2, t3). This also controls for the 
duration dependence where a state that received assistance in recent year(s) 
have a different probability of receiving aid compared to a country which has not 
received aid for many years (Boutton and Carter 2014). The second stage takes a 
better advantage of the panel data properties and introduces a lagged dependent 
variable (LDV) to account for donors’ inertia and recipient-specific fixed effects 
to account for heterogeneity across recipients. The inclusion of LDV in a fixed-
effects setting creates a risk of biased estimates. Nonetheless, Judson and Owen 
(1999) showed that the bias is negligible in models with large N and T and in any 
case it is concentrated in the coefficient on LDV, which is not of interest in this 
study. Finally, all estimates are based on yearly observations and the explanatory 
variables are lagged by 1 year to alleviate worries of endogeneity (see Lis 2013). 
Such an approach has been successfully used by Boutton and Carter (2014) and 
Lai (2003). The inclusion of the cubic polynomial that measures the number of 
years since a country received aid enables a probit model to behave like a dura-
tion model, and hence removes the distorting effects of temporal dependence in 
the selection stage. At the same time, the inclusion of LDV in the allocation stage 
deals with the autocorrelation problems by dynamically modeling the autocor-
relation process (Carter and Signorino 2010; Lai 2003).
3  Results
Table 1 presents the estimates for the effects of terrorism and armed conflict on 
aid, with the first panel showing results for bilateral aid and the second panel for 
multilateral aid. The first two columns in each panel show coefficients for inter-
national terrorism, while the remaining columns show estimates for domestic 
terrorism. The results for the non-violent variables are generally consistent with 
expectations and the literature. The amount of received aid appears to be larger 
for countries which were receiving aid in previous years. This could be explained 
by a number of factors, including the donor inertia or already established and 
functioning aid links and programmes. States with larger populations seem less 
likely to become recipients of bilateral aid. This “population bias” could be an 
outcome of the donors’ preference to spend limited resources where the impact 
of one dollar will be the greatest per person (Trumbull and Wall 1994). Nonethe-
less, once a country passes the “gate-keeping” stage, the relationship between 
aid receipts and population size becomes positive. Unsurprisingly, more aid is 
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granted to states with lower GDP per capita. States with a larger degree of eco-
nomic openness can count on favourable treatment by bilateral donors at the 
allocation stage. Bilateral donors also appear to favor less democratic countries 
at the selection stage. This could be dictated by donors’ strategic interests and 
a relatively lower cost of achieving policy concessions from more dictatorial 
regimes (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith 2007). In contrast, multilateral donors 
reward civil liberties at both stages.
The estimates in Table 1 suggest that countries suffering from terrorism are 
more likely to receive foreign assistance. In addition, the amount received from 
bilateral donors is likely to be higher in the presence of attacks. Donors may feel 
compelled to respond not only to the threat of international terrorism but also to 
domestic terrorism because the two variants are linked with the latter Granger-
causing the former (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011). This finding is con-
sistent with the principal-agent framework in which aid constitutes support for 
recipient’s efforts to fight terrorism (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas 2011). 
Bilateral donors are likely to perceive foreign aid as a part of their counterterror-
ism toolkit and means of convincing other states to undertake counterterrorism 
efforts which would protect donor’s political and economic interests. This may 
be important because an increase in security at donor’s home may persuade ter-
rorists to substitute towards softer targets in other countries (Lis 2011), making 
donor’s assets abroad more vulnerable. The donor’s aim of reducing terrorism 
can be achieved even through aid which is not conditioned on counterterrorism. 
Aid to other areas can free up receiving government’s resources which then can be 
used in fighting terrorists. Furthermore, terrorism and conflict are often linked to 
the lack of economic opportunities (Berman et al. 2011; Bueno de Mesquita 2005), 
thus by improving the economy and population’s living conditions aid may suf-
ficiently increase the opportunity cost of joining violent groups. As Caruso and 
Schneider (2013) and Caruso and Gavrilova (2012) show, an increased opportunity 
cost of terrorism is likely to lead to a reduction in the incidence and brutality of 
attacks. In a paper looking at the Latin American countries, Meierrieks and Gries 
(2012) demonstrate that the effect of economic growth is not homogenous across 
states and it reduces terrorism only in the less developed countries. Since aid 
seems to be targeted at poorer states, it may have a desirable effect on terrorism, 
assuming it is also effective in promoting growth. However, promotion of eco-
nomic growth among the less developed states should not be the only concern. 
Support for democracy appear to be just as important because countries which 
have achieved intermediate levels of development but have no strong democratic 
institutions are more prone to terrorism (Boehmer and Daube 2013).
The two types of donors seem to respond differently to an onset of armed con-
flict. Multilateral organizations are less likely to give aid to a conflicted country 
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and when they do so the aid amount is likely to be lower relative to aid given to 
peaceful states. In contrast, bilateral donors appear willing to assist states expe-
riencing armed conflict, but they also penalize violence by reduced aid flows. 
This behaviour may stem from bilateral donors’ attempts to protect their political 
and economic interests by assisting a regime considered as useful or friendly. At 
the same time, multilateral donors are expected to be less politically motivated 
and more constrained in their actions as they are required to balance interests of 
their members who often have different geopolitical interests. The donor’s con-
flict aversion may also be motivated by the worries over excessive influence of 
military strongmen or lack of government accountability in a receiving country 
(Mallaby 2002). Thus, cutting aid to troubled recipients and giving it to the peace-
ful states may be intended to show the benefits of good policies and maintaining 
social peace and stability.
Overall, the evidence suggests that multilateral donors are more averse to 
armed conflict as well as less influenced by incidence of terrorism when making 
their aid allocation decisions. As Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004) and 
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) show, violent instability is associated with smaller 
investment, poor policies and higher risks of resources being misused which alto-
gether amount to a negative effect on economic growth. Such behavior of multi-
lateral donors may be a signal of a larger commitment to the efficient use of aid 
and promotion of economic and social development, however more evidence is 
required to make a reliable judgment.
An issue that has not received attention in the aid literature is the treatment 
of countries with populations that are 50% or more Muslim. This “Islam factor” 
may be particularly important in the context in which aid is motivated by coun-
terterrorism. Since the late 1970s an increasingly large share of terrorism has been 
associated with Muslim fundamentalists (Lis 2011). This may have led to a differ-
ent treatment of those states by aid donors. Table 2 presents the estimation results 
for the sample of Muslim countries. The coefficients on control variables are fairly 
similar to those in Table 1 with two exceptions. First, donors do not exhibit the 
“population bias” and do not appear to respond to economic openness. Second, 
bilateral donors are less likely to assist Muslim countries with a lower degree of 
civil liberties. Perhaps, this could be assigned to the fact that the Muslim coun-
tries tend to be less free on average. Their mean value of the civil liberties index 
is 5.24, compared to 3.34 for the rest of the sample. Thus, donors might conclude 
that the civil liberties in many of those countries are out of the acceptable range 
that could be explained to donors’ electorates.
Both multilateral and bilateral donors appear to be neutral to terrorism 
occurring in the Muslim countries. This is surprising given the frequent percep-
tion that those countries are the source of fundamentalist terrorism which has 
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plagued the world for more than three decades. It is possible that donors do not 
believe that some of the Muslim governments have enough capacity or good will 
to effectively address the root causes of violent instability and effectively fight 
terrorism. Multilateral donors appear consistent in their aversion to conflict and 
are less likely to give aid to a country experiencing an outburst of armed conflict. 
In contrast, bilateral donors do not seem to react to armed conflict. One cannot 
rule out that there are other factors at play, such as geopolitical interests, when 
determining aid to the Muslim countries. Over one-third of those countries are 
major oil producers and their oil exports may be a dominant factor in foreign aid 
decisions (Lis 2013). However, a reliable explanation of the donors’ behavior will 
require additional evidence and a less aggregated estimation approach.
4  Conclusions
This paper has used a panel of countries to consider the effects of armed conflict 
and terrorism on the flows of bilateral and multilateral aid. It has shown that 
armed conflict has a strong negative impact on multilateral aid, while it increases 
the likelihood of receiving bilateral assistance. This result, although counterin-
tuitive, may be motivated by the bilateral donors’ drive towards safeguarding 
their geopolitical and economic interests in affected countries. The occurrence 
of either type of terrorism is associated with a higher likelihood of receiving aid 
and an increased inflow of bilateral aid. This is consistent with the principal-
agent model in which recipients receive additional assistance in return for their 
counterterrorism efforts. Thus, bilateral donors may be using foreign aid as a 
substitute to defensive homeland efforts. In doing so, they should be aware of 
the basic lesson from the principal-agent model: the recipient is unlikely to be 
fully committed to eradicating terrorism as this would mean a loss of aid funds. 
In extreme situations recipients could encourage more terrorism to increase their 
aid receipts. The role of such strategic considerations may help to explain why aid 
is argued to be ineffective in promoting economic and social development.
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